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RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ISSUES IN WARFARE:
WHAT MILITARY LEADERS NEED TO KNOW

BY

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RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ISSUES IN WARFARE:
WHAT MILITARY LEADERS NEED TO KNOW

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Military leaders need to know the potential impact that religious/cultural practices within a theater of war may have on the accomplishment of the mission. Religious/cultural issues or information are often important in planning for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and for the direction and tasks a commander assigns to his subordinates. While not all information is applicable to every scenario, this kind of information helps the commander to understand the context in which he pursues his mission objectives and, therefore, helps him to make sense of much of the facts and statistics available. It is extremely important that U.S. policy makers and military leaders become knowledgeable about the religious/cultural issues that will likely play an important role in any lasting political or military resolution to conflicts. Understanding the religious/cultural heritage out of which a nation's values arise, becoming knowledgeable of and sensitive to religious/cultural practices and prohibitions, and conducting upfront planning that accounts for the impact of religious/cultural issues on all levels of war will serve U.S. political and military leaders well in their tasks of foreign policy and preparation for future wars, should diplomacy fail.

INTRODUCTION

What military leaders don't know can hurt them. This axiom is true whether in reference to enemy capabilities or to the potential impact that religious/cultural practices within a theater of war may have on the accomplishment of the mission. Timely, relevant information from any source, but especially from staff areas of expertise provides the "grist for the mill" of effective campaign planning. During the assessment of the environment it is essential that the commander be apprised of any religious/cultural issues or information that may have an impact on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war or on the direction and tasks he assigns to his subordinates.

Clausewitz's concept of "center of gravity" is used by military planners to integrate intelligence and operations. Clausewitz used this term to describe "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends".¹ In Joint Pub O-1 a center of gravity is defined as : "That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war".² Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity and protecting one's own centers of gravity require that commanders be provided with intelligence that is timely, objective, responsive, complete, accurate, and relevant.³

Recent studies on C3I indicate that critical information may be lost due to the volume of available information. Automation has brought about an "information explosion" that can inundate a commander with incoming facts and statistics.⁴ The challenge then becomes identifying which information is critical or relevant. Clearly not all such information is applicable to every scenario confronting military leaders. However, some kinds of information help the commander to understand the context in which he pursues strategic, operational and tactical objectives and, therefore, help him to make sense of much of the facts and statistics that are available.

The focus of this paper is to identify and discuss some of the kinds of religious/cultural information that are helpful to military leaders as they seek to understand the nations in their areas of responsibility and develop contingency plans for potential scenarios of military conflict. The paper will discuss the importance of understanding the human dimension in warfare; it will explore the relationship of religious self-understanding to national values and national centers of gravity; and it will assess the impact of religious/cultural issues on the three levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN WARFARE

Over 2500 years ago Sun Tzu said: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril".⁵

This ageless wisdom is recognized by most commanders and planners of military operations as an important principle of war and its application has long been a part of the staff planning process. The importance of "Knowledge of self" and "knowledge of the enemy" is highlighted in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U S Armed Forces. The publication stresses that "The challenge for joint force commanders normally is not to amass more data but to extract and organize the knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy."⁶

Very often in warfare some of the "knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy" turns out to be knowledge about the enemy's self-understanding that emanates from his religious and cultural heritage and practices.

Even a cursory look at some of the wars in history reveals that knowledge about the religious self understanding of friendly and enemy forces can play a critical role in the identification of centers of gravity and assist in determining how they may be dealt with. The validity of this claim will be demonstrated in the next section of this paper which examines the religious/cultural basis of a nation's values and the influence of national values in the shaping of its foreign policy and military strategy.

RELIGIOUS SELF UNDERSTANDING AND NATIONAL VALUES

The religious/cultural heritage of a nation plays a key role in the self understanding of its people and the shaping of its

crucial, or core, values. Therefore, national values and, in turn, national interests flow from a nation's religious/cultural beliefs that influence the nature of its form of government and that guide the conduct of its internal and external relationships. This may be seen by examining the central role the concept of religious freedom played in the founding of the United States and its constitution which insists upon the separation of church and state. How can such insistence be explained? The answer lies in "what led Westerners to reject a territorial and theocratic role for religion"⁷ The historical soil from which this rejection grew is explained by one scholar this way:

The church was never more involved in politics than during the era of the Holy Roman Empire when faith and territory were joined as a principle of membership in church and state. Under the empire Christianity became "Christendom", and the political ruler was seen as God's appointed agent, the earthly counterpart to the heavenly sovereign. In that scheme political affairs and religious matters were two aspects of one and the same reality. Church and state were united for the same purpose, even though as institutions they represented different functions.... Conformity rather than personal persuasion was the chief end of religious activity.⁸

As pluralism and social mobility grew, the drive for religious freedom led to the collapse of the religious empire and, with it, a change in perspective that viewed religion as personal experience rather than membership in a divinely ordained church. "The church was", as John Locke wrote in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), "transformed from territoriality to

voluntarism."⁹ Such teachings are the basis for the U.S. constitutional insistence on religious freedom and democratic pluralism. They also explain why Westerners have such great difficulty with Islamic claims of territoriality through theocratic forms of government.

By contrast, Muslim self-understanding and attitudes toward government are shaped by the life and teachings of Muhammad the Prophet who "established territoriality, dar al-Islam, as the handmaid of religious faith".¹⁰ Thus, Islam's evolution was different from that of Judaism and Christianity, the other monotheistic religions which existed in the territory where the Prophet Muhammad lived and to which many references were made in the divine revelations received by him. The historian, Bernard Lewis, writes that for Islam, religion was the state. The Prophet Muhammad was its military commander who made war and negotiated peace, collected taxes, created laws and administered the justice system. This explains why most Muslims view "Shariah", the holy law of Islam, as the guide of any legitimate government.

Conversely, Jesus Christ taught from the beginning that a distinction should be made between what belonged to God and what belonged to the State or Caesar. From the outset, Christianity has recognized two separate authorities--church and state--existing at times in conflict and at times in harmony. Thus, the notion of Christendom was a distortion of Christ's teaching. In the case of Judaism there is less clarity since classical,

rabbinic Judaism evolved after the dissolution of the Hebrew state. Judaism, therefore, falls somewhere between Christianity and Islam in the relationship between religion and the state."¹¹

There is a great deal of sense then in the assertion that "It is only if we are aware of how our selection of goals, our vision, reflects our [national] character that we may become truly free."¹² Another writer claims that a nation cannot chart its foreign policy "unless it knows both its history and ethics".¹³ He further asserts that "a statesman wholly out of joint with the norms, mores, and traditions--that is, the core values--of his society can be no leader".¹⁴ The values of any nation then, reflects its inherited religious/moral principles.

If leaders are to succeed at understanding the interests and goals of a nation, it is essential that they understand first the religious/cultural heritage out of which its national identity has been shaped. This is expressed clearly by some earlier foreign policy scholars who maintained that a nation's core values "are deeply imbedded in the general cultural and political philosophy of a society and are powerful, if intangible and subjective guides to action."¹⁵ Kissinger expressed that connection when he wrote: "Our moral convictions must arm us to face the ambiguity inseparable from the long haul or else they will wind up disarming us".¹⁶

Therefore, understanding the values and goals of a society can provide insights for identifying and assessing the "characteristic, capability, or locality" that is the wellspring

of a nation or military force's center of gravity. For example, the United States national will to fight or to intervene in the affairs of nations and conflicts has historically been tied to its perception of outrage over blatant acts of aggression and oppression. This energy and the willingness to risk U.S. lives flows from the nation's values of basic human rights. These values grow out of a religious/cultural heritage that affirms the worth, dignity, and created equality of every person. When these national values are violated by United States forces, as in the My Lai incident or by the enemy, as in the cruelties of the Bataan Death March, one United States center of gravity, i.e. the "will to fight" can be strengthened or diminished.

In addition, a nation's values, stemming from its religious heritage, can limit the way it conducts war and, thereby influence the political and military outcome of war. For the United States, this connection is clearly specified as the basis for U.S. Army doctrine in its field manual, FM 100-1 The Army by the statement: "Military forces are instruments of political purpose [and] such limitations as are inherent or implied in political purposes must also be reflected in military missions and tasks". Col. (Ret.) Harry Summers, Jr., a recognized national military strategist and syndicated columnist, maintains that "America's perceptions of right and wrong derived almost entirely from our Judeo-Christian heritage...has always played a major role in American military affairs".¹⁷ The validity of this

assertion is supported in a statement made during the 1951 Senate hearings on the Korean war.

American policy, in every war in which this country has been engaged, has been designed to win the conflict at the very earliest possible moment with the least possible loss of human life - especially American life, but also the lives of those who oppose us.¹⁸

Although there have been exceptions, such as the bombing raids on cities during World War II and the stated aim of attritting enemy strength in Vietnam, this value-based foreign policy has never-the-less played a major role in the U.S. military conduct of war. An example is that even with the attrition strategy in Vietnam, the U.S. never carpet bombed Hanoi. Summers accurately points out:

With our nuclear bombs and missiles we had the physical capability to obliterate North Vietnam a hundred times over. The constraint was moral, not physical, but was no less real on that account. The fact was that the American people simply would not permit such actions to be taken in their name.¹⁹

The U. S. conduct of war in Vietnam also provides an example of how an enemy succeeded in using knowledge of one of the nation's value based centers of gravity against it. North Vietnam held out against great military odds, knowing that the U.S. self-imposed limitations would work ultimately in their favor. During POW/MIA negotiations in 1975, a U.S. delegate commented to a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) colonel "You know that with nuclear weapons we had the means to totally destroy you anytime we chose to do so." The NVA colonel responded: "We knew that. We also knew that you'd never do it".²⁰ North Vietnam

successfully identified and attacked a strategic U. S. center of gravity: the self-imposed constraint on the destructive levels of its warfare. This constraint is morally based, arising out of America's religious heritage and identity. Military strategy and planning that does not factor in such important religious or cultural influences on all levels of war is clearly deficient and could play a role in its success or failure.

THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ISSUES AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL ON THE CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE GULF WAR

In some cases, religious self-understanding may play a central role in the shaping of policy to protect friendly strategic centers of gravity. It is generally recognized that maintaining the United Nations coalition of forces was a strategic, friendly force center of gravity. As one writer puts it: "Cohesion within the coalition was critical, especially among the key regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the smaller gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria".²¹ The concern to maintain the unanimity and solidarity of the U.N. forces was based on the fear of losing strategic and operational resources due to the break up of the coalition. Basing rights, host nation support, cooperation in intelligence gathering, the authority of the U.N. mandate, all could be jeopardized by the failure to deal effectively with religious and cultural differences.

It was important that the joint force commander have an understanding of the religious groups and cultural practices

within the theater and, as stated above, the potential impact that they may have on the accomplishment of the mission. When multinational personnel work closely together, as they did throughout the Gulf war, knowing basic religious customs and courtesies helps tremendously to prevent and limit some unintentional but potentially embarrassing and disrespectful behavior.²²

Recognizing this CENTCOM published General Order #1, which provided explicit guidelines to U.S. personnel "placed in AOR [Area of Responsibility] countries where Islamic law and Arabic customs prohibit certain activities generally permissible in western societies".²³ It stated that such "Restrictions are essential to preserving U.S. - host nation - combined operations relations".²⁴ (See Table No. 1). Thus, one critical kind of religious/cultural information needed by military leaders are such prohibitive behaviors that could cause problems among multinational forces working together in a coalition effort.

TABLE NO. 1

Desert Shield General Order GO-1

Prohibited Activities (30 August 1990)

Applicability: All US military/civilians serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces (United States) in the USCENTCOM AOR, who are deployed with or acting in support of Operation Desert Shield.

Purpose and Necessity: US Armed Forces placed in AOR countries where Islamic law and Arabic customs prohibit certain activities generally permissible in western societies. Restrictions are essential to preserving US-host nation-combined operations relations.

Prohibited Activities: (Abbreviated)

- ° Purchase, possession, use, sale of privately owned firearms, ammunition, explosives...

- ° Entrance into a Mosque... by non-Moslems, unless directed by military authority or required by military necessity.
 - ° Introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture or consumption of any alcoholic beverage.
 - ° Introduction, possession, transfer, sale, creation or display of any pornographic photograph, videotape, movie, drawing, book or magazine...
 - ° Introduction, possession, transfer, sale, creation or display of any sexually explicit photograph, videotape, movie, drawing, book or magazine... By way of example...body building magazines, swim--suit editions. . . lingerie or underwear advertisements and catalogues...
 - ° Gambling of ny kind, including sports pools, lotteries and raffles.
 - ° Removing, possessing, selling, defacing, destroying archaeological artifacts, or national treasures.
 - ° Selling, bartering or exchanging any currency other than at official host-nation exchange rate.
 - ° In the event of armed conflict, taking of war trophies.
 - Private property cannot be confiscated...
 - Enemy property captured by US Armed Forces is the property of the United States.
 - ° Limited exceptions...
-

To summarize, in a war that, for the first time, pitted Arab nations in a coalition with Western nations against a fellow Arab country, there was great concern that Western forces not offend the religious/cultural traditions and practices of the host nation and thereby jeopardize the coalition. There was also an awareness that host nation support was critical, especially for the U.S. units arriving in country at the beginning of the buildup of forces. "With the rapid buildup of ground forces, there was no time to wait for equipment and supplies to arrive from the United States. Almost everything that XVIII Airborne Corps did not bring with them had to be obtained from within Saudi Arabia, the host nation."²⁵ It was imperative that soldiers integrated into the logistic force structure work

closely with Saudi civilian government, and military sources to secure agreements for assistance in kind. "The majority of the soldiers deployed had little or no knowledge of Islamic culture."²⁶ Both unit chaplains and civil affairs soldiers provided religious/cultural orientations that helped to lessen the culture shock and prepare soldiers to work with Saudi nationals.

The evidence indicates that U.S. efforts to teach soldiers to respect and make accommodations to Saudi Arabian religious and cultural practices were largely highly successful. The words of the final report to Congress on the conduct of the Persian Gulf war say it well:

It is a tribute to American service men and women that, under conditions of considerable stress and hardship, they demonstrated impeccable respect for a culture much different from their own. They recognized the importance to their mission of the overall relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Their superb conduct will have a long-lasting, positive effect; the reputation they established will make it easier to build future coalitions with Middle Eastern and other partners.²⁷

The recognition by the U.S. and coalition leaders that mutual accommodation and respect for religious and cultural differences was a critical element in the glue that held the coalition together drove them to be intentional in their planning and execution of operations.

THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ISSUES ON THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF THE GULF WAR²⁸

In assessing the impact of religious/cultural prohibitions upon U.S. military operations in Saudi Arabia and during the Gulf War, U.S. leaders determined that one prohibition would prove operationally too costly. It was imperative that the conflict be resolved upfront to avoid a cultural clash that could strain U.S. - host nation - combined operations relations. The potential conflict centered around the Saudi Arabian law prohibiting women from driving a motor vehicle. Realizing that this was a "war stopper" given the large number of female U.S. forces who are assigned and trained military vehicle operators, CENTCOM negotiated an exception with the Saudis allowing U.S. female military members to drive while in the theater of war. This exception was easier to obtain because of the respect and compliance ordered by CENTCOM toward other Islamic and Arabic prohibitions.

Another kind of religious/cultural information that can be critical to the development of effective operational concepts has to do with religious practices. This is especially true when host nation support is an integral part of the plan to support the force. The shortage of U.S. Army heavy equipment transports (HETS) to move armored vehicles and other heavy equipment from the port facility in Dammam to unit tactical assembly areas necessitated contracting for Saudi trucks and drivers.

In the early transport missions Saudi trucks and drivers were mixed with U.S. Army HETS to form convoys moving tanks and Bradleys north on the only North-South highway. Problems began

to occur when many of the Saudi HETS didn't reach their destination with the rest of the convoy. Valuable time was lost as commanders sent recovery teams looking for them.

In most cases the Saudi HETS had not experienced mechanical breakdowns, as commanders had assumed. Instead, they had dropped out of the convoys to say their Islamic prayers or to eat at the end of a long Ramadan fast day. Had these religious practices been considered in operational planning, stops could have been scheduled to accommodate them, avoiding the delays in closing all vehicles in the convoys and the many hours spent tracking down lost HETS loaded with essential equipment.

U.S. military leaders at all levels were faced with still another operational challenge. How would commanders care for the religious needs of their own forces who were religiously pluralistic when Saudi Arabian law prohibited the practice of any religion other than Islam? The answer was a compromise that allowed U.S. and western allied forces to practice religious faiths other than Islam only in private and in troop areas where no host country nationals worked or traveled. While Saudi officials knew that other religions were probably being practiced, such as worship and prayer meetings, they insisted on not knowing "officially" and that no religious acts or symbols other than Islam be conducted in public or be publicized in any way.

While this could have produced a morale problem among U.S. and other Western coalition forces, it was managed discreetly by

both sides. The "squeeze" felt by those charged with providing religious support to Christian and Jewish soldiers among U.S. forces is captured by the comments of one U.S. Army division chaplain:

Religion was a very sensitive subject in this Muslim land. Our UMT's [Unit Ministry Teams] were present and charged up for ministry to all our soldiers, but we didn't want to be labeled as the "Ugly Americans", insensitive to Arab culture and religion. All chaplains were ordered to stay away from the news media because Saddam Hussein was using it as propaganda to show that we were really there to destroy Arab culture and religion. The press got to a few of us anyway, but we did a good job evading them. At first we were asked to be called Morale Officers but as soon as we got to the desert it was "chaplain". We were extra careful about Jewish services so each chaplain and assistant verbally announced "J" services Saturdays at the division rear...²⁹

Very early in the planning Desert Storm it became clear that another cultural consideration would have both operational and strategic importance for U.S. forces. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made a strong, clear statement about the treatment of Iraqi prisoners. Those who surrendered or were captured would be detained, turned over to Saudis, and treated as guests in his country. Even though his country was at war with Iraq, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) would be treated as fellow Arabs and given the hospitality normally extended to such. His view became coalition policy and assisted in strengthening a coalition that many saw as fragile and vulnerable. It, therefore, contributed to the strategic goal of 'coalition building' leading up to the war. The EPW policy also affected operational considerations.

Commanders at all levels were instructed to insure that all U.S. soldiers understood that EPWs were to be treated not only by the Laws of Land Warfare, but with utmost respect and handed-off to the Saudi military as soon as possible. Although the policy paid great dividends for the coalition and friendly psychological operations (PSYOPS), it often proved costly in time and manpower as U.S. soldiers exercised great care to comply with the spirit of the directive.

THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS/CULTURAL ISSUES ON THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

King Fahd's insistence that surrendering and captured Iraqis be extended as many Saudi religious/cultural courtesies as the tactical situation allowed proved both fortuitous and wise. At a time when the first attempt was being made to build a coalition of forces from Arab/Muslim nations and Western nations against another Arab/Muslim country, this policy helped to discredit Saddam Hussein's efforts to portray the conflict as U.S. intervention in Arab/Muslim affairs. In addition, it was a move seen as consistent with Saudi Arabia's special religious/cultural role as the custodian of the Holy center of Islam. The Saudi's have viewed its responsibility to be a respectful and hospitable host to the world's Muslims as a sacred trust for centuries. The Saudi King's wisdom in this matter was borne out by a very positive response to the policy from most Muslims throughout the region.

The King's policy proved fortuitous in that it reaped great PSYOPS benefits for the U.N. coalition forces. Coalition leaders believed that many of the Iraqi's military, comprised for the most part of large numbers of unwilling conscripts, lacked the moral will and national loyalty to fight a sacrificial war. Leaflets that publicized Saudi Arabia's "hospitality policy" were highly effective on the tactical level resulting in the surrender of thousands of Iraqi soldiers without their ever firing a shot. The assurance that they would be treated with the cultural respect and hospitality of Arab/Muslim family guests was a strong attraction for them to gain relief from the pain and discomfort of coalition bombing strikes and a defeated logistical system that left them with limited food and medical supplies. Appealing through leaflet pictures to their cultural value of sitting around a table with fellow Arabs and brother Muslims made surrender inviting and dignified.

The results, then, of demonstrating respect and recognition for the religious/cultural values of both the enemy and innocent civilians displaced by the war can be tactically and strategically advantageous. As one writer puts it, "In many respects, those caring actions have the greatest long-term effect on the resolution of the conflict and future stability".³⁰ The evidence is overwhelming that coalition forces had a great technological superiority, the brilliance of the "Hail Mary" plan is unquestioned, and the superb training of U.S. forces was splendidly demonstrated. However, a close analysis of the

Persian Gulf War campaign indicates that "its success was the result of many complex and diverse factors that came together at the unique time to produce superb results".³¹

Religious/cultural issues were clearly important "factors" at all levels of the conduct of the campaign.

CONCLUSION

In Clausewitz's view, the physical and "moral" forces of war cannot be separated. He even views the moral forces as being more fundamental to the conduct of war.³² He states that "Fighting--- is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter."³³ Physical factors, according to him, "seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."³⁴ If Clausewitz is correct in his assertion that "moral forces" ultimately determine the outcome of war, then it can be strongly argued that in any conflict morale and will stemming from a nation's religious/cultural heritage should be a primary consideration.

What is apparent is that leaders at all levels need a fundamental understanding and appreciation of the importance of religious/cultural issues for their soldiers and the potential impact of such issues on all levels of the conduct of warfare. The soldier's first requirement is moral and physical courage, both--[for]--the acceptance of responsibility and the suppression of fear."³⁵ Or, as General George C. Marshall is often quoted as

saying, "The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his country in the end."³⁶

While nations ask their soldiers to be willing to suffer hardships and to kill if need be to protect national interests, they also ask their soldiers to be willing to die for the same reasons. If soldiers are to survive the rigors, demands, and horrors of combat, an essential ingredient is the 'will to resist' stemming from the moral force of their religious/cultural identity and a sense that the mission at hand is consistent with national values and purpose. Wise military leaders will give this element of success appropriate attention and consideration; and, if they miscalculate its importance, they will do so at the risk of great cost.

It is also apparent that the success of a strategic leader depends on his ability to use information--or on what Clausewitz termed his '---sensitive or discriminating judgement' and his 'ability to scent out the truth', in identifying enemy centers of gravity.³⁷ While some of this ability is based on personality and experience, much of it is acquired in the study and understanding of the characteristics of potential enemies and theaters of war. Jay Luvass writes that "Long before beginning the active operations, Napoleon habitually turned to history and geography (along with politics and statistics) to find out all that could be learned about the enemy and the likely theater of

operation".³⁸ Almost always, Napoleon's preparation for war included the study of his adversary's religious/cultural roots and documents. According to one biographer,

Bonaparte carefully searched out the weak places of the organism which he was about to attack---the climate and natural products, the genius of its writers and the spirit of its religion---nothing came amiss to his voracious intellect, which assimilated the most diverse materials and pressed them all into his service. Greek mythology provided allusions for the adornment of his proclamations, the Koran would dictate his behavior toward the Moslems, and the Bible was to be his guide-book concerning the Druses and Armenians---.³⁹

As an example of more recent history, most of the writings and reports about the Persian Gulf War make it clear that General Schwarzkopf had a firm grasp of the political and strategic environments as well as the operational tactical climates in the theater of operations. His understanding of the important linkages that existed among them allowed him to make decisions that brought both a resounding victory on the battlefield and a successful political resolution to sensitive coalition issues.⁴⁰

Among the radical changes brought about by the "Post Cold War Era", which is characterized more by disorder and uncertainty than the years of our bi-polar past, there has been a major shift in the kinds of world conflicts likely to occur. U.S. foreign policy and security experts are challenged to identify the 'trouble spots' of the world and define U.S. national interests in the world's regions. Increasingly, conflicts around the world are religious and ethnic in nature. Currently, fundamentalist

Muslim groups are challenging the political leadership of several nations (Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey to name a few) and ethnic strife has erupted into complicated and bloody war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It becomes extremely important, then, that U.S. policy makers and military leaders become knowledgeable about the religious/cultural issues that will likely play an important role in any lasting political resolution to conflicts. In addition, there are religious/cultural issues that are key to building and maintaining coalitions. This is a critical area of study if the United States is to pursue its "stated preference for multilateral action".⁴¹ Understanding the religious/cultural heritage out of which a nation's values arise, becoming knowledgeable of and sensitive to religious/cultural practices and prohibitions, and conducting upfront planning that accounts for the impact of religious/cultural issues on all levels of war will serve U.S. political and military leaders well in their tasks of foreign policy and preparation for future wars, should diplomacy fail.

Finally, 'knowledge is power'. History is replete with examples of leaders who used intelligence well and those who didn't. Napoleon, Churchill and Eisenhower are among the former; Hitler, Rommel, and Nixon the latter.⁴² Their successes or failures make a powerfully, convincing point, 'What leaders don't know or refuse to learn can play a critical role in the outcome of battles and the future of nations'.

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ENDNOTES

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⁴James P. Kahan, D. Robert Worley, Cathleen Stasz, Understanding Commanders' Information Needs (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, June 1989), 3.

⁵Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

⁶Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U S Armed Forces, 11 Nov 91, 34.

⁷Lamin Sanneh, "Muslim-Christian Encounters: Government Under God, Christian Century, Dec 2, 1992, 1103.

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⁹Ibid., 1103.

¹⁰Ibid., 1104.

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¹³James H. Toner, The Sword and the Cross, Reflections on Command and Conscience (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 41.

¹⁴Ibid. 41.

¹⁵William Reitzel, Morton Kaplan, and Constance Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy: 1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956), 473.

¹⁶Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), 242.

¹⁷Harry G. Summers, Jr. COL (U.S. Army Retired) "The Chaplain As Moral Touchstone", Military Chaplains' Review, Spring 1990, 4.

¹⁸U.S. Congress. Senate. Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations. "Military Situation in the Far East" 82d Congress. 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951) Part 5, 3598.

¹⁹Summers, 5.

²⁰Ibid., 5.

²¹Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of The Persian Gulf War (Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, 1992) 4.

²²LTC Marc Michaelis, "The Importance of Communicating in Coalition Warfare", Military Review, Nov 1992, 47.

²³Desert Shield General Order GO-1, U.S. Army Central Command, 30 Aug 1990.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵LTC Norman F. Hubler, USAR, "Civil Affairs and Wartime Host Nation Support", Military Review, July 1992, 72.

²⁶Ibid., 78.

²⁷Conduct of The Persian Gulf War, (Final Report To Congress, A, April 1992) I-6.

²⁸In the Persian Gulf War the author of this paper served as the Division Chaplain of The First Cavalry Division. Most of the following information is based on his personal experience and knowledge during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

²⁹Gary T. Sanford, "The 1st Team Goes to Saudi Arabia", Military Chaplains Review, Summer 1991, 82.

³⁰Craft, 43.

³¹Ibid, 44.

³²Patrick M. Cronin, "Clausewitz Condensed", Military Review, August 1985, 47.

³³Clausewitz, 127.

³⁴Ibid., 185.

³⁵Cronin, 47.

³⁶ George C. Marshall, "The Bedrock of Our Profession," {Department of the Army Pamphlet [DA PAM] 600-68, White Paper, 1986}, 10.

³⁷ Clausewitz, 100-12.

³⁸ Jay Luvass, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence: The Jena Campaign of 1805", Leaders and Intelligence (Great Britain: A. Wheaton & Co. 1989) 41.

³⁹ John Holland Rose, The Life of Napoleon (2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1901), I, 169-70.

⁴⁰ Craft, 44-45.

⁴¹ National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, January 1993) 3.

⁴² Michael I. Handel, Leaders and Intelligence (Great Britain: A Wheaton & Co., 1989) 6-13.

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